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CARRIER IQ, PRE-TRANSIT KEYSTROKE LOGGING, AND THE
FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
Andrew D. Salek-Raham*
Mobile analytics software companies must walk afine line between
providing useful data to their customers-handset manufacturers
and wireless network operators-and protecting the privacy rights
of consumers whose data they collect. In late 2011, a relatively
unknown Connecticut-based systems administrator named Trevor
Eckhart revealed that mobile analytics software developer, Carrier
IQ, may have crossed this line by surreptitiously collecting
outgoing cell phone numbers, SMS message text, and web
addresses on user handsets. Although recent judicial decisions
have narrowly interpreted the Federal Wiretap Act to exclude pre-
transit keystroke logging, courts hearing the upcoming Carrier IQ
class action suits should abandon these narrow interpretations in
favor of a broader interpretation consistent with the Act's original
purposes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late October 2011, the market research company,
International Data Corporation ("IDC")' praised Carrier IQ
("CIQ"),2 a mobile analytics software developer, for being a
. J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, Class of 2013.
I would like to thank the University of North Carolina Journal of Law and
Technology editors and staff for their invaluable assistance throughout the
writing process. I would also like to thank Professor Anne Klinefelter for her
professional guidance.
' International Data Corporation ("IDC") is a subsidiary of International Data
Group and, among other services, conducts research on information technology,
telecommunications, and consumer technology companies to help investors
"make fact-based decisions on technology purchases and business strategy."
About IDC, INT'L DATA CORP., http://www.idc.com/about/about.jsp?
t-1329585496880 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
2 Carrier IQ is a mobile analytics software development company that
specializes in collecting, storing, and analyzing handset user data on behalf of
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"leading provider of Mobile Intelligence solutions" to over 141
million handset devices and named the California-based firm a
2011 "[c]ompany to [w]atch."' Several weeks later, a relatively
unknown Connecticut-based systems administrator named Trevor
Eckhart4 posted a YouTube video' that simultaneously revealed
both the "creepy"6 inner workings of the cell-phone software and
the irony of IDC's description, accusing CIQ of surreptitiously
collecting a host of private user data, such as sent text message
contents, visited web addresses, and dialed phone numbers.' In the
handset manufacturers and wireless service providers, who then use that data to
improve network and product performance. Network Operators, CARRIER IQ,
http://www.carrieriq.com/network-operators/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
Founded in 2005, the company's software has already been installed on over
141 million handsets. Matthew J. Schwartz, Carrier IQ v. Wiretap Laws, INFO.
WK., http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/privacy/ 232200565 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2012). Prior to accusations of surreptitious surveillance, the
company was recognized not only by IDC as a company to watch, but by other
groups as well. About Carrier IQ, CARRIER IQ, http://www.carrieriq.com/about-
us (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). The Wall Street Journal, for example, ranked
Carrier IQ ninth on its Next Big Thing 2011 List of the Top 50 Venture-Funded
Companies. Id.
3 Press Release, Carrier IQ, Carrier IQ Named as an Innovative Business
Analytics Company Under $ 1OOM to Watch by Leading Analyst Firm (Oct. 27,
2011), available at http://www.carrieriq.com/documents/27-october- 2 0 11-
carrier-iq-named-innovative-business-analytics-company-under- I OOm-to-watch-
by-leading-analyst-firm/6592/.
4 Prior to accusing Carrier IQ of suspicious data collections, Trevor Eckhart
worked as a systems administrator for Intergis LLC, a sales associate at Staples,
and an independent IT consultant. Trevor Eckhart's Homepage, TREVOR
ECKHART.COM, http://trevoreckhart.com/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
A self-proclaimed skilled programmer, he is also an "Eagle Scout &
rock/roller." Id.
5 Carrier IQ Part #2, YOUTUBE (NOv. 28, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=T I 7X QIAYNo&feature-player embedded.
6 Gerry Smith, Carrier IQ: Researcher Trevor Eckhart Outs Creepy, Hidden
App Installed on Smartphones, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2011, 12:11
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/30/carrier-iq-trevor-eckhart-n 11
20727.html.
7 See Larry Greenemeier, Is Carrier IQ's Data-Logging Phone Software
Helpful or a Hacker's Goldmine?, SCI. AM. (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://blogs.scientific american.com/observations/2011/12/03/is-carrier-iqs-data-
logging-phone-software-helpful-or-a-hackers-goldmine/. Software of this type
is commonly called "rootkit" software, which "is used to gain control over your
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weeks following Eckhart's accusation, cell-phone users filed
dozens of class action lawsuits claiming that CIQ, wireless
carriers, and handset manufacturers intercepted their private
electronic communications in violation of the Federal Wiretap Act
("FWA"). 8
While courts agree that electronic communications intercepted
by a third party while in flight between the sender and the recipient
are within the definition of an illegal interception under the FWA,
courts disagree over whether information intercepted before
transmission but not technically in flight-like that collected by
CIQ-may be covered as well.9 In the context of the unfolding
CIQ litigation, the question becomes: Should courts interpret the
FWA to encompass the pre-transit keystroke logging performed by
CIQ on behalf of wireless carriers and handset manufacturers?'o
In short, the answer is yes. Courts that interpret the FWA not
to include keylogging" rely on an erroneous understanding of the
desktop by hiding deep inside your system. Unlike most viruses, it is not
directly destructive . . . [but] provide[s] access to all your folders . . . to a remote
user." What is a Rootkit and How it Infects Your PC, GUIDING TECH (July 19,
2010), http://www.guidingtech.com/4467/what-is-a-rootkit/.
8 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006). See, e.g., Complaint
at 6, Janek v. Carrier IQ, No. 1:11-cv-08564 (E.D. Mo. filed Dec. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/106453596/Class-Action-against-
Carrier-IQ_-HTC (filing suit against CIQ for FWA violation).
9 Compare U.S. v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding
that keylogging interception was not covered under the FWA because the
interception did not occur between the sender and recipient, but occurred prior
to transfer), and U.S. v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1050 (1lth Cir. 2003) (holding
that hacker's acquisition of child pornography stored on defendant's computer
did not violate the FWA because the information was not intercepted while in
flight), with U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (arguing
that the FWA covers in flight as well as contemporaneous interceptions that
occur immediately after e-mail receipt), and Potter v. Havlicek, No. 3:06-cv-
211, 2007 WL 539534, at *8 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (arguing that a pre-transit
interception could fall within the FWA because it could affect interstate
commerce).
'0 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
" "Keylogger" is a shorthand phrase for "keystroke logger." Definition:
Keylogger (Keystroke Logger, Key Logger, or System Monitor), SEARCH
MIDMARKET SECURITY (May 2004), http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget.
com/definition/keylogger.
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Act's key terms, disregard analogous situations and technologies
that are explicitly covered under the Act, and overemphasize the
importance of technical minutiae, resulting in judicial outcomes at
odds with the FWA's original purpose." By interpreting the FWA
to include keylogging interceptions of pre-transit communications,
courts will reach results consistent with both the language and
policy goals of the Act, ensuring that privacy protections for
modem handset users are commensurate with those originally
intended by Congress.
Part II of this Recent Development reviews past scholarly
attempts at defining privacy law, generally, while Part III provides
an overview of how the CIQ software collects user data and
describes several of. its allegedly illegal functions. Part IV
summaizes the relevant portions of the FWA and reviews various
judicial interpretations of the Act as it applies to pre-transit
keystroke logging. Part V examines the FWA's structure and
legislative history to argue for a broader interpretation of the Act
and explores possible outcomes of the CIQ class action suits.
II. DEFINING PRIVACY
On the surface, the CIQ litigation is merely concerned with
matters of FWA interpretation-whether "intercept" and
"electronic communication" encompass pre-transit keylogging."
But from mobile privacy invasions 4 to domestic drone
surveillance" to GPS tracking,'" technological progress and
12 See infra Part V.A-C.
13 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.
14 See, e.g., iPhone Apps Path and Hipster Offer Address-Book Apology, BBC
(Feb. 9, 2012, 10:13 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16962129
(reporting on the apologies issued by two iPhone application makers for
uploading user address-book information without express permission).
'5 See, e.g., Chris Kirk, Domestic Drone Bill Upsets Civil Liberties Advocates,
MEDILL NAT'L SECURITY ZONE (Feb. 10, 2012), http://nationalsecurityzone.org/
site/domestic-drone-bill-upsets-civil-liberties-advocates-domestic-drone-bill-
upsets-civil-liberties-advocates-domestic-drone-bill-upsets-civil-liberties-
advocates/ (noting disagreement over bill that would require FAA to make it
easier for law enforcement to use unmanned aircraft).
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privacy interests continually prove to be negatively correlated."
On a deeper level, therefore, the CIQ litigation is symptomatic of
the historically present but increasingly prevalent tension between
technology and individual privacy rights."
While identifying that the CIQ litigation implicates privacy
concerns is simple, precisely defining the right to privacy is not."
There are several reasons for this difficulty. First, the right to
privacy is not derived from a single source; tort law,20 evidence
law,' property rights,22 contract law,23 and constitutional law24 all
16 See generally U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (addressing whether the
warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a motor vehicle constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment).
17 In his concurrence, Justice Alito noted the historical tension between
technological advances and privacy interests and the resulting effect on the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that [the] hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations. But technology can change those expectations.
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant
changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased
convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people
may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not
welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they
may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.
Id. at 10 (Alito, J., concurring).
8 Id.
19 See, e.g., Lillian R. Bevier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of
Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protections, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 455, 458 (1995) ("Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used
denotatively to designate a range of wildly disparate interests-from
confidentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy .... ).
20 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960)
(identifying four privacy-related torts).
21 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 32 (3d ed. 2008) ("The law of evidence has recognized the
importance of protecting the privacy of communications between attorney and
client, priest and penitent, husband and wife, physician and patient, and
psychotherapist and patient.").
22 See, e.g., David J. Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational
Surveillance in Wireless Communication, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 21 ("In U.S.
legal theory, privacy rights are intimately entwined with rights to access
physical spaces.").
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contribute to the overall concept of privacy. Second, considering
historical scholarly difficulties with defining the right, even if the
right to privacy did have a single origin, identifying it likely would
not help to sharpen its inherently nebulous contours."
Writing in 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis made
perhaps the first and most famous attempt at defining the right to
privacy. Concerned about privacy invasions resulting from
"[i]nstantaneous photographs" and the "newspaper enterprise,"26
Warren and Brandeis rooted their right to privacy in the common
law and conceptualized the right as one protecting individuals from
violations of "the 'honor' of another."27 Over a century later and
continuing the attempt to define the boundaries of the right to
privacy, leading privacy scholar Daniel Solove characterized the
Warren and Brandeis definition as one dealing with "dignitary
harms"28 and identified five other characterizations of the right29 :
(1) the right to control information-the right to exert "control
over knowledge about oneself';3 0 (2) the right to limit access to the
self-the ability to "shield oneself from unwanted access by
others";" (3) intimacy "both in its relation to identity and . . . to
23 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1251 (1998) (arguing for a default rule for defining how
personal information is used but allowing "[t]hose parties for whom the default
rule is inefficient" to contract otherwise).
24 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (establishing a
fundamental right to privacy).
25 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477,
477-78 (2006) ("Privacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it
means.").
26 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
27 Id. at 198.28 See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 487.
29 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087,
1092 (2002) (identifying these major categories).
30 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968).
31 Solove, supra note 29, at 1092; see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 433 (1980) (arguing that the concept of
privacy is composed of three "irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and
solitude," control over which allows us to control the "extent to which we are
known to others").
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autonomy";3 2 (4) personhood-the right to protect "one's
personality, individuality, and dignity";" and (5) secrecy-the
right to conceal "certain matters from others.""
After examining that list, Solove's oxymoronic suggestion that
the right to privacy encompasses both everything and nothing
begins to make more sense;" the characterizations are individually
under-inclusive, arguably overbroad in the aggregate, and all
overlap." Despite their breadth, several of the above right to
privacy categorizations accurately describe the major privacy
concerns associated with CIQ-like data collections. Conceiving of
privacy as the right to control personal information, the right to
limit access to the self, or the right to secrecy all seem applicable
in the context of user accusations that CIQ software surreptitiously
collects SMS text, phone numbers, and URL information.
Perhaps the easiest way to identify the nature of the privacy
interests at stake would be to identify the potential harms caused
by the alleged CIQ data collection; the central issue is whether
losing the rights to secrecy, to control personal information, or to
limit access to the self will injure handset users in any way."
Scholars believe that loss of individual control over private data
would cause both direct and indirect harm to individuals and
society as a whole. First, there is the direct and obvious risk of
fraud or identity theft and the resulting financial, dignitary, or
physical harm that could follow." Second, a general loss of
32 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 263
(1977).
33 Solove, supra note 29, at 1092.
34 d
3 Solove, supra note 25, at 479.
36 See Solove, supra note 29, at 1094 ("The conceptions are often too narrow
because they fail to include the aspects of life that we typically view as private,
and are often too broad because they fail to exclude matters that we do not deem
private.").
n See infra Part V.E for a more specific discussion.
38 Solove, supra note 25, at 488 ("Activities involving a person's information,
for example, might create a greater risk of that person being victimized by
identify theft or fraud.").
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personal control over private data could lead to broader societal
'architectural' problems"39 :
[A] particular activity can upset the balance of social or institutional
power in undesirable ways. A particular individual may not be harmed
directly, but this balance of power can affect that person's life. The
classic example is law enforcement officials having too much power,
which can alter the way people engage in their activities. People's
behavior might be chilled, making them less likely to attend political
rallies or criticize popular views . ... Imbalances in power can also be
risk enhancing, in that they increase abuses of power.40
Regardless of how CIQ's interceptions are characterized and the
right to privacy defined, CIQ-like data collections cause dignitary
harms when performed without consent and present a clear threat
to users' ability to control third party access to their private
information.
III. MOBILE ANALYTICS AND CARRIER IQ SOFTWARE
Generally speaking, analytics companies collect, synthesize,
and present aggregated user information to their customers to help
them reduce maintenance costs, increase revenue, and improve the
performance of a particular product.4 While analytics companies
provide usability metrics for a wide array of customers in all
industries,42 mobile analytics companies specialize in providing
39 Id. at 487.40 Id. at 488.
4 1 About Usability, USABILITY PROF'L ASS'N, http://www.upassoc.org/
usabilityresources/about usability/definitions of usability.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2012) ("The business benefits of adding usability to a product
development process include: [i]ncreased productivity, [i]ncreased sales and
revenues, [d]ecreased training alnd support costs, [r]educed development time
and costs, [r]educed maintenance costs, [i]ncreased customer satisfaction."
(bullet points omitted)).
42 "Usability really just means making sure that something works well: that a
person of average (or even below average) ability and experience can use the
thing-whether it's a website, a fighter jet, or a revolving door-for its intended
purpose without getting hopelessly frustrated." BOB TULLIS & BILL ALBERT,
MEASURING THE USER EXPERIENCE: COLLECTING, ANALYZING AND
PRESENTING USABILITY METRICS 4 (2008) (quoting STEVE KRUG, DON'T MAKE
ME THINK (2000)). All that is required are "some common themes: A user is
involved, [t]hat user is doing something, [t]hat user is doing something with a
product, system, or other thing." Id. (bullet points omitted).
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solutions specifically tailored for products relating to mobile web
and telephone services.43 For example, application-based analytics
companies monitor user crash data for individual handset
applications, while mobile web analytics companies collect data
relating to mobile handset user webpage views and click
behavior."
A. Carrier IQ, Generally
CIQ is one of many such mobile analytics companies.$ It
specializes in providing usability data to handset manufacturers
and their wireless network operators to ensure proper handset and
network performance.46 Typically, wireless network operators use
these data collections to remedy dropped calls, lost SMS messages,
or weak network signal strength.47 Prior to using embedded
software to collect performance metrics,4 carriers and handset
manufacturers relied on data from customer surveys, returned
products, or customer complaints to diagnose and solve service
problems.4 9 These processes are cumbersome and unreliable and
43 Madeleine Moss Funes, The ABCs of Mobile Analytics, SMART DATA
COLLECTIVE (July 21, 2011), http://smartdatacollective.com/brett-stupa
kevich/38317/abcs-mobile-analytics.
4 Id.
45 See Mobile Analytics Providers, MOBILE STRATEGY, http://m-
strat.org/mobile-analytics (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (providing a compiled list
of mobile analytics providers).
46 See Haley Tsukayama, Who's Using Carrier IQ and for What Purpose?,
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/technology/whos-using-carrier-iq-and-for-what-purpose/2011/12/01/gI
QAGeHpHO story.html ("Carrier IQ's program is meant to collect user data to
'assist operators and device manufacturers in delivering high-quality products
and services to their customers.' "); Reinvent Customer Care, CARRIER IQ,
http://www.carrieriq.com/reinvent-customer-care/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
47 See Press Release, Carrier IQ, Understanding Carrier IQ Technology *1l-
*13 (Dec. 15, 2011) available at http://www.carrieriq.com/documents/12-
december-2011-understanding-carrier-iq-technology/6596/.
48 "[The] individual measurements on a device, such as signal strength, are
called metrics." Id. at *4.
49 See Mobile Intelligence for Network Operators, CARRIER IQ,
http://www.carrieriq.com/network-operators/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012) ("Sure
you can deploy field trucks, use network probes and protocol sniffers, wait for
returns, conduct user surveys, or just hope that customers will call in.").
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typically involve filling out surveys, questioning disgruntled
consumers who are returning products, and collecting and
synthesizing general customer oral complaints. Furthermore, these
processes rely on customers to recognize problems with their
products and effectively communicate them to a company
employee before the company can even begin to identify a system-
wide solution."o CIQ's software improved the efficiency and
reliability of problem identification and analysis by offering
carriers embedded handset software that automatically provides
real-time data directly from user handsets without requiring user
participation or knowledge."
Mobile analytic software like CIQ's is vital for handset
manufacturers and wireless carriers because it provides them with
the ability to accurately determine how their services and devices
perform in the real world, to analyze data in real time so wireless
carriers can identify and rectify problems immediately, and to
work together to improve usability when their products interact.52
As important as this information is for network operators and
manufacturers now, it will only become more valuable in the
future as smartphones and tablets grow in both their capabilities
and total market share of Internet-connected devices.
50 Id. ("[N]one of these [pre-CIQ software] options delivers a clear picture of
service quality or the true user experience.").
5' Id. (noting that CIQ "automatically [provides] accurate, real-time data
direct from the source-[their] customers' handsets," with "no visible impact to
[their] customers"). CIQ sells its software and services to handset
manufacturers as well as wireless carriers, but carriers comprise the majority of
their clientele. See Press Release, Carrier IQ, supra note 47, at *2.
52 See Reinvent Customer Care, CARRIER IQ, supra note 47.
5 See, e.g., Diane Mermigas, Future Growth: It's All About Mobile, MEDIA
POST (Oct. 15, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/
publications/article/137796 (describing the "latest data framing the emerging
global mobile paradigm that is reinventing consumer orientation for every
business in every industry"); CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX:
GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORECAST UPDATE, 2011-2016 3 (2012),
available at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/
ns537/ns705/ns827/white paper-cll-520862.pdf (predicting that by the end of
2012, there will be more connected mobile devices than people on Earth and that
"[g]lobal mobile data traffic will increase 18-fold between 2011 and 2016").
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B. Relationship Between Carrier IQ, Wireless Carriers, and
Handset Manufacturers
Three parties are typically involved in the installation of CIQ's
analytics software: CIQ, wireless carriers, and handset
manufacturers.54 First, the carriers purchase CIQ's software, called
"IQ Agent,"" and specify what profile will best fit their needs.56
Profiles define the frequency and type of information, or metrics,
that will be collected by the IQ Agent and vary depending on the
types of performance problems the carrier would like to address."
After the profile is defined, CIQ provides installation instructions
to the handset manufacturers, who write the software necessary to
pass data metrics from the phone to the IQ Agent." Once
embedded, the IQ Agent-which "cannot be deleted by consumers
through any method provided by Carrier IQ" 59-is responsible for
54 See Press Release, Carrier IQ, supra note 47, at *6.
5s Id. at *4. The Carrier IQ software installed on the mobile device is called
the IQ Agent. Id. The IQ Agent is the first stage in the Network Operator's
analytics pipeline and is responsible for identifying, storing, and forwarding
diagnostic measurements and data from the handset and the network required to
solve network and consumer issues. Id. The IQ Agent has been implemented
on feature phones, smart phones, data modems, and tablets. Id.
56 id.
s7 Id. The press release goes on to explain:
Each mobile network is different from the others. In order to serve all
of those varying needs, Carrier IQ created software that allows
Network Operators to create a subset of these metrics (a profile)
tailored to solve their individual network requirements. For example,
if a Network Operator is interested in understanding the cause of
dropped calls, a specific profile can be created to address this issue.
That profile is passed to devices loaded with the IQ Agent instructing
the devices to provide the Network Operator with metrics for dropped-
call events. The profile then gathers the associated signaling messages,
location, radio conditions and any other essential measurements
leading up to the call termination, thus eliminating non-essential data,
such as successful call events.
Id.
58 Id. CIQ instructs handset manufacturers on installation specifics by
providing them with a "porting guide and a metric requirements specification"
that "enables the handset manufacturer to write a software interface to pass the
necessary metrics from the handset to the IQ Agent." Id. at 6.
59 Id.
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sifting through cell phone data and relaying information according
to its installed profile."o This method, called the "embedded IQ
Agent," is the most common method CIQ uses to install its
software on user handsets and was the method used to install the
CIQ software in Trevor Eckhart's YouTube demonstration.6 '
There are two other methods for installing CIQ on user
handsets: the "preload IQ Agent," which differs from the
embedded IQ Agent method only because it collects less detailed
information,62 and the "after-market downloadable IQ Agent,"
which is installed by consumers on their own after they have
purchased their mobile device." Of the three, carriers most prefer
the embedded IQ Agent-it is pre-installed, collects a more
comprehensive dataset than either the preload or after-market IQ
Agent, and cannot be deleted by consumers.'
In sum, under the embedded method each party has a distinct
and necessary role in collecting user data; carriers define the data
to be collected, CIQ writes the software to meet these
specifications, and handset manufacturers install the software onto
"feature phones, smart phones, data modems, and tablets."6 5 So
while CIQ has been the lightning rod for criticism-and rightly so,
since they own the software-manufacturers and wireless carriers
also have been sued for directing what information the IQ Agent
60 Id. at *4 ("The IQ Agent . . . is responsible for identifying, storing and
forwarding diagnostic measurements and data from the handset and the network
required to solve network and consumer issues.").
61 Id. at *6; see Carrier 1Q Part #2, supra note 5.
62 See Press Release, CARRIER IQ, supra note 47, at *5 (noting that the pre-
load IQ Agent "does not require integration by a device manufacturer . .. but the
main difference between pre-load and embedded is that the radio diagnostic data
... are not available for analysis with the pre-load version").
63 Id. at *6 ("In this model, a mobile device user would download the IQ
Agent on instruction from Carrier IQ's customer-typically a Network
Operator. The metrics available to the downloaded IQ Agent are the same as the
pre-load agent.").
6 Id.; see also Carrier IQ Part #2, supra note 5.
65 See Press Release, Carrier IQ, supra note 47, at *4.
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should collect, installing the IQ Agent, and using the aggregated
data for diagnostic purposes."6
C. Alleged Collection ofImproper Data
Eckhart's YouTube demonstration67 revealed that the IQ Agent
surreptitiously collects more information than seems necessary for
network quality control purposes, although CIQ, network
operators, and manufacturers disagree as to why.6" The video
begins by highlighting how difficult it is just to find the CIQ
application on his HTC handset; it does not appear in the phone's
"all applications" list, nor does it appear in the "running
applications" list." As noted above, CIQ readily admits that the
user cannot remove the embedded IQ Agent.70 Eckhart shows that
not only is the IQ Agent installed and running despite never
informing the user of its presence or requesting user consent, but
the user is also unable to force-stop the application and prevent it
from collecting and relaying data.7 '
In addition to being difficult to discover and impossible to
remove, Eckhart demonstrates that the IQ Agent registers
keystrokes when the user dials a phone number or performs a
Google search, and records the URLs of visited websites and the
66 See Complaint, Howell v. Carrier IQ, No. 12CVOOO 157 (D. Minn. Jan. 19,
2012) (filing suit against CIQ, wireless carrier AT&T, and handset manufacturer
Apple).
67 See Carrier IQ Part #2, supra note 5.
68 See Press Release, Carrier IQ, supra 47, at 8. Carrier IQ claims that
botched manufacturer software installations are at least partially responsible for
these additional collections and notes that the IQ Agent only collects
information at the direction of its clients. See id.; John Paczkowski, Carrier 1Q
Speaks: Our Software Ignores Your Personal Info, ALL THINGS D (Dec. 1, 2011
4:35 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20111201/carrier-iq-speaks-our-software-
monitors-service-messages-ignores-other-datal (quoting CIQ CEO Larry
Lenhart as saying, "It's the operator that determines what data is collected ....
They make that decision based on their privacy standards and their agreement
with their users, and we implement it.").
69 See Carrier IQ Part #2, supra note 5.
70 See id. at 6 ("An embedded version of the IQ Agent cannot be deleted by
consumers through any method provided by Carrier IQ.").
71 Id.; see Carrier 1Q Part #2, supra note 5.
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contents of SMS72 text messages." Notably, the keystrokes are
logged when typed and prior to user transfer, and all the
information is recorded even when the handset is disconnected
from the wireless network.74
From a policy perspective, these allegations, if true," are
problematic for a number of reasons. First, many users consider
embedding this type of software without notice or consent to be, as
one commentator called it, "an insane breach of trust."7 6 Second,
even if CIQ's motives are benign and its "treasure trove"" of data
kept anonymous, as it claims, any such treasure trove will tempt
hackers, advertisers, and law enforcement to find ways to access
72 "SMS stands for 'short message service' ... [and] is often referred to as
texting." Adam Fendelman, Definition of SMS Text Messaging: What is SMS
Messaging, Text Messaging?, ABOUT.COM, http://cellphones.about.com/
od/phoneglossary/g/smstextmessage.htm.
73 See Carrier IQ Part #2, supra note 5.
74 Id. The fact that data is collected even when disconnected from the wireless
network vitiates the likelihood that CIQ, handset manufacturers, and wireless
carriers will successfully fall within an exception to the FWA that permits
operators of a wireless communications service to access certain information for
quality control and network maintenance purposes. See Federal Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). Specifically, if a court found that the interceptions were
permissible per this exception, the parties could still be liable for any
interception that occurred while the handset device was not connected to the
wireless network. Id.
7 CIQ has denied nearly all of Eckhart's allegations against the IQ Agent,
claiming that its software "does not record, store or transmit the contents of
SMS messages, email, photographs, audio or video. For example, we
understand whether an SMS was sent accurately, but do not record or transmit
the content of the SMS." Phil Nickinson, Carrier IQ, in a New Press Release,
Reminds Us it Works for the Carriers, ANDROID CENT. (Dec. 1, 2011, 11:07
PM), http://www.androidcentral.com/carrier-iq-new-press-release-reminds-us-it-
works-carriers. CIQ has also taken pains to point out that it "acts as an agent for
the operators," who determine the diagnostic information that is actually
gathered. Id.
76 The Carrier IQ Cellphone Scandal: "An Insane Breach of Trust," THE WK.
(Dec. 1, 2011, 6:36 PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/222053/the-carrier-iq-
cellphone-scandal-an-insane-breach-of-trust.
n David Kravets, Carrier IQ Admits Holding "Treasure Trove" of Consumer




it." Additionally, from a legal perspective, such unauthorized
interceptions could violate the FWA, the basics of which are
explored in the following section.
IV. INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL WIRETAP ACT
The original purpose of the FWA was to protect the privacy of
communications made over a wire from continuing unauthorized
surveillance.7 9 Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA")" in 1986, which updated the FWA to
prohibit the interception of new electronic communications not
contemplated by the original statute. Specifically, the ECPA
updated the FWA's provisions to cover "any person who ...
intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . electronic communication.""
The Act defines "intercept" as "the ... acquisition of the contents
of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device," and defines
"electronic communication" as "any transfer" of information by a
"wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce."82 The
definitions of intercept and electronic communication, then, are
linked, and an interception of information might not be an
interception under the Act if the communication is determined not
to fall within the definition of electronic communication." Since
78 See infra section V.E; Bob Brown, Cornell Prof Carrier IQ Affair "My
Worst Nightmare, " NETWORK WORLD (Dec. 2, 2011, 10:40 AM),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/120211-comell-carrieriq-
253696.html ("How hard would it be to 'de-anonymize' a pile of text messages
between me and my wife? . .. Banking IDs with passwords?").
7 E.g., U.S. v. Councilman (Councilman 11), 418 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 2005)
(en banc) ("[T]he purpose of the broad definition of electronic storage was to
enlarge privacy protections for stored data under the Wiretap Act .. . .").
80 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-
2711, 3121-3127 (2006)).
81 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006).
82 Id. § 2510.
83 See U.S. v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that
the terms "intercept" and "electronic communication" are "bound up with the
jurisdictional element of the statute and requires that the transmission be made
by a system that affects interstate commerce").
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the ECPA was passed in 1986, the FWA has not received a
significant update to Sections 2510. and 2511, the sections
addressing interceptions of electronic communications.
The following sections demonstrate that, like those of scholars,
judicial interpretations of the FWA's core terms vary widely.
Specifically, courts are split as to the proper scope of the FWA's
application to pre-transit keylogging.8 Some courts interpret the
FWA narrowly and refuse to cover interceptions other than those
made while the communication is in-flight," while others extend
the FWA beyond in-flight interceptions.
A. Narrow Interpretations
Courts ruling that the FWA does not cover keylogging fall into
two main groups: the first is comprised of courts that narrowly
interpret the meaning of "interception," while the second group
focuses on the meaning of the requirement that the interception
occur on a system affecting interstate commerce.
1. Group One: Narrow Interpretations ofInterceptions
The Eleventh Circuit, drawing on the storage-transit
dichotomy" to narrowly interpret the meaning of interception,"
84 See supra note 9; see also Jason C. Gavejian, Keylogging-Jurisdictions at
Odds Over Privacy Concerns, WORKPLACE PRIVACY DATA MGMT. & SECURITY
REPORT (May 13, 2010), http://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/
2010/05/articles/workplace-privacy/keyloggingjurisdictions-at-odds-over-
privacy-concerns (citing several splits among lower courts).
85 See e.g., Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831; U.S. v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572
(D.N.J. 2001).
86 See, e.g., U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010);
Councilman II, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
87 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Steiger highlights what
is known as the storage-transit dichotomy. 318 F.3d 1039, 1048 (1lth Cir.
2003); see also Michael D. Roundy, The Wiretap Act-Reconcilable
Differences: A Framework for Determining the "Interception" of Electronic
Communications Following United States v. Councilman's Rejection of the
Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW. ENG. L. REv. 403, 418-19 (2006)
(defining the storage/transit dichotomy to mean that interceptions of stored data
are not covered under the FWA, while interceptions of information in transit
between sender and recipient are covered). In Steiger, a computer hacker gained
unauthorized access to the defendant's computer, where he discovered a cache
of child pornography that he turned over to police. Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1042.
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refused to apply the FWA to pre-transit keylogging in U.S. v.
Barrington." Barrington had all the trappings of a bad late '80s
movie-a group of fraternity brothers at Florida A&M installed
keylogger software on a university registrar computer to record
passwords that they later used to change students' failing grades
and in-state tuition status." The software recorded keystrokes as
they were entered from the keyboard, and there was no evidence
that the software captured any information as it was being
transmitted beyond the registrar's computer." The court held that
the FWA did not apply to this software, ruling instead that the
FWA only covers interceptions that are "contemporaneous" with
transfer, which it defined as interceptions occurring during
interstate transfer or at the moment the information is transmitted
beyond the sender's computer."
2. Group Two: Narrow Interpretations of Systems Affecting
Interstate Commerce
The Central District Court of California's holding in United
States v. Ropp9 3 is an example of a narrow interpretation of the
The court ruled that the hacker's acquisition of information stored on the
defendant's computer did not violate the FWA because "such unauthorized
viewing merely gained access to stored electronic communications." Id. at
1050. The court reasoned that "intercept" in the FWA only covered
unauthorized acquisition of information that is in transit, not stored. Id.
Although Steiger does not deal with keylogging, the concept of the storage-
transit dichotomy is applicable to all FWA cases.
88 U.S. v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011).
8 Id. at 1202-03.
90 Id. at 1183-84. The defendants not only changed their own grades, but also
charged others for the service. Matthew Richardson, Grade Change Scandal,
THE FAMUAN (Mar. 27, 2009, 1:03 AM), http://www.thefamuanonline.com/
news/grade-change-scandal- 1.1631482#.TOcAt ES2Ag. Hours after police
questioned Barrington, he coordinated a plan to gain access to the registrar
system to make further grade changes, which included having some students
distract registrar employees while others installed the keyloggers. Barrington,
648 F.3d at 1202. Thinking they were in the clear, the group celebrated at
Chili's, and continued to make grade changes. Id. Their celebration was
premature. Id.
91 Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1202-03.
92 Id.
93 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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FWA focusing on the requirement that the communication travel
over a system affecting interstate commerce.94 The defendant in
Ropp attached an external keystroke logger to the cord running
between the sender's keyboard and her personal computer ("PC"),
which was linked to the Internet and her company's national
network-both interstate systems-at all times.9 5 Examining the
requirement that the communication be transmitted "in whole or in
part by a ... system that affects interstate commerce,"96 the court
reasoned that the Act only covered interceptions that occur while
the communication travels within a "system that affects interstate
or.foreign commerce."97 It then turned its attention to defining the
system in question and the technology used to make this particular
interception and decided that, although the PC-to-Internet system
is an interstate system within the meaning of the FWA, the
interception did not occur there but on the non-interstate keyboard-
to-PC "system."98 Because the court viewed the keyboard-to-PC
connection as a separate, non-interstate system rather than as a
necessary component part to the PC-to-Internet interstate system,
94 Id. at 837-38 ("[T]he Court concludes that the communication in question
is not an 'electronic communication' within the meaning of the statute because it
is not transmitted by a system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.").
95 Id. at 831.
96 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006).
97 Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 837 ("[T]he communication in question is not an
'electronic communication' . . . because it is not transmitted by a system that
affects interstate or foreign commerce."). The defendant argued that, because
the keylogger recorded the information before it reached the CPU, the
interception was not made simultaneous with a transmission of information
affecting interstate commerce, as the Act requires, and therefore was not an
"interception" under the Act. Id. at 832. The government disagreed, and
claimed that the keylogger did violate the FWA because it "literally stripp[ed]
communication off a wire as the communication was being transmitted from one
point to another." Id.
98 Id. at 838. The court also noted that:
Although this system is connected to a larger system-the network-
which affects interstate or foreign commerce, the transmission in issue
did not involve that system. The network connection is irrelevant to
the transmissions, which could have been made on a stand-alone
computer that had no link at all to the internet or any other external
network.
Id
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the court effectively interpreted keyboard-to-PC keylogging to be
outside the purview of the FWA.99
The New Jersey District Court similarly interpreted the FWA
in United States v. Scarfo.on Like Ropp, Scarfo involved a
keylogger, but differed in several important ways. First, the
keylogger was placed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
within the PC itself, not between the keyboard and PC. Second,
the keylogger was programmed only to record keystrokes when the
computer's modem was disabled, and therefore not connected to
the Internet or any other interstate system.o' Like Ropp, the Scarfo
court held that only interceptions of transmissions made when the
communication is traveling within an interstate system fell within
the FWA.IO2 Because the communications were collected by the
FBI keylogger when the PC was closed off from the Internet or
other interstate connections, the interceptions could not have been
made while the information was traveling within an interstate
system, and therefore the intercepted communications were not
electronic communications for the purposes of the Act.103
3. Summary ofNarrow Interpretations
According to the courts interpreting the statute narrowly via
either the interception or interstate system elements, a few
requirements for a transmission to be considered an electronic
communication become clear. First, the communication must be in
flight between point A and point B to be considered intercepted; a
file intercepted in storage will not suffice.'" Second, the in-flight
interception must occur as the transmission is moving over a
99 Id
00 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
os See id. at 581-82 ("The default status of the keystroke component was set
so that, on entry, a keystroke was normally not recorded. .Upon entry or
selection of a keyboard key by a user, the [keylogger] checked the status of each
communication port installed on the computer, and, all communication ports
indicated inactivity, meaning that the modem was not using any port at that
time, then the keystroke in question would be recorded.").
102 Id. at 581.103id.
'0 See U.S. v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 2011); U.S. v.
Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048-51 (11th Cir. 2003).
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system affecting interstate commerce, but the message itself need
not travel across interstate lines.o' Finally, systems that may
facially appear to be interstate systems-like PCs with an Internet
connection-may not be if the interception is found to have been
made on a portion of the system that the court considers to be a
completely separate system (e.g., the keyboard-PC system in
Ropp),'o6 or if the potentially interstate system is not functioning as
an interstate system at the time of the interception."'
It is important to introduce several problems with these narrow
interpretations, all of which will be discussed in detail in Part V.
First, the way in which Ropp and Scarfo determined that their
respective interceptions occurred on a non-interstate system seems
contrived: Why did the Ropp court decide the keyboard-PC
connection was a separate non-interstate system rather than a
component part of an interstate system? How can future courts
distinguish the two categories? Second, courts like Barrington that
exclude pre-transit keylogging from the FWA ignore other portions
of the FWA that indicate a broader legislative intent.'" Finally,
these narrow interpretations likely would remove Carrier IQ-like
keylogging from FWA coverage, resulting in undesirable policies
for the consumer public that would undermine individual privacy
rights.
B. Broader Interpretations
Although not in the keylogging context, other courts have
interpreted the FWA more broadly by focusing on the meaning of
intercept.' In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz,"o the Seventh
Circuit implicitly agreed with the Barrington court, holding that
interceptions under the FWA only covered contemporaneous
transfers."' Writing for the majority, Judge Easterbrook, however,
0o See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572.
1'0 See U.S. v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
107 See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572.
o See infra Part V.A, C.
109 See, e.g., U.S. v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010);
Councilman II, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
"o 622 F.3d 701.
"1 Id. at 706.
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defined contemporaneous more broadly, arguing that the meaning
of " '[c]ontemporaneous' differs from 'in the middle' "112 and
could extend beyond the rigid in-transit timeframe established by
opinions like Barrington."
The Seventh Circuit's ruling was based at least partially on a
previous case that similarly expanded the FWA beyond strict in-
transit interceptions: In United States v. Councilman (Councilman
H), "l4 the First Circuit addressed the meaning of "intercept"
relating to e-mail interceptions."' When sent, e-mail messages are
split into packets that momentarily pause at various computers
while in transit for rerouting."6 The defendant in Councilman II
gained unauthorized access to e-mail messages as they were in
momentary storage along their route, and claimed that, because the
FWA only covers interceptions contemporaneous with transit, his
interceptions of the information while in storage were outside the
Act's scope."' The First Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected this
argument and held that certain interceptions of stored information
can be considered contemporaneous with transfer and therefore
covered under the FWA."' Councilman II and Szymuszkiewicz,
112 id
113 Several other courts, like Barrington, interpreted "contemporaneous" to
mean strictly in-transit. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 352 F.3d
107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003); U.S. v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1047-49 (11th Cir.
2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876-78 (9th Cir. 2002);
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 460-62 (5th Cir.
1994).
114 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc). Councilman II's en banc decision
reversed Councilman 1, which held that the FWA did not apply to the
interception because it was made while the information was in temporary, split-
second storage while in-transit between sender and recipient. U.S. v.
Councilman (Councilman 1), 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320-21 (D. Mass 2003),
aff'd, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
" Councilman 11, 418 F.3d at 79.
' 16Id. at 69.
117 Id. at 72 ("Councilman argues, however, that Congress intended to exclude
any communication that is in (even momentary) electronic storage. In his view,
'electronic communications[s]' under the Wiretap Act are limited to
communications traveling through wires between computers.").
118 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 79 ("Councilman's core argument on appeal is
that because the messages at issue, when acquired, were in transient electronic
SPRING 2012] 437
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
then, represent a distinct break from the narrow interpretations of
the Barrington, Ropp, and Scarfo courts, and interpret
"contemporaneous" and the FWA to include interceptions made
while in temporary storage between sender and recipient and those
made just after receipt.
V. ARGUMENT FOR BRINGING PRE-TRANSIT KEYLOGGING
WITHIN THE FWA
Although the decisions in Szymuszkiewicz and Councilman II
are distinguishable from the previously mentioned narrow
interpretations"l because they do not apply directly to keylogging,
both cases lay the foundation for the argument that the FWA can
legitimately apply to interceptions of communications that are not
in-transit, depending on whether a court applies-and how it
defines-the requirement that an interception be contemporaneous
with transfer. A court rejecting the narrow positions could either
follow the lead of the First and Seventh Circuits and rely on a
contemporaneous interpretation of "intercept" or could argue for
inclusion via a broader definition of "interstate system."
Regardless of the legal basis for such a decision, a broader
interpretation of the FWA has the additional policy benefit of
ensuring that interceptions made during handset text
composition-a period of time that seems, conceptually, to be a
"virtually instantaneous 'conversation[]' more like a telephone call
than mail"20-are valued and protected similarly to interceptions
made while the communication is traveling between sender and
recipient.'2 1
storage, they were not 'electronic communication[s]' and, therefore, section
2511 (1)'s prohibition on 'intercept[ion]' of any 'electronic communication' did
not apply. That is the argument that we have now rejected .....
119 See supra Part IV.A.1-3.
120 H.R. REP No. 99-647, at 22 (1986); see infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
121 See infra Part V.B. Part V will only examine how courts should interpret
the FWA as it relates to ClQ-like interceptions and does not address legislative
options. Of course, Congress could remedy CIQ-like data collections
legislatively, and, as of this writing, has begun to do so. See Markey Releases
Discussion Draft of Mobile Device Privacy Act in Wake of Carrier IQ Software
Concerns, CONGRESSMAN ED MARKEY, (Jan. 30, 2012),
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A. Using Statutory Structure to Infer Congressional Intent to
Cover Certain Stored Content
As discussed in Part IV.A.1, the Barrington court narrowly
interpreted the FWA by equating "interception" with "in transit."' 2
This position is untenable when the interception requirement is
read in context with other portions of the FWA and the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA").123  First, in Section 2510 of the
FWA, the definition of "electronic communication" specifically
exempts from coverage "electronic funds transfer information
stored by a financial institution in a communications system used
for the electronic storage and transfer of funds." 2 4 Why would
Congress need to specifically exempt from coverage a certain type
of stored communications if, as Barrington held,'25 all interceptions
of stored communication fall outside the scope of the FWA?
Congress' specific exclusion of stored financial information from
http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-releases-discussion-draft-mobile-
device-privacy-act-wake-carrier-iq-software. In late January 2012, Rep. Ed
Mackey released a discussion draft of the Mobile Device Privacy Act, which
would require mobile telephone software developers, manufacturers, service
providers, and vendors to obtain the user's informed consent prior to installing
any mobile analytics software on a user cell phone or selling a cell phone
containing such software. See Mobile Device Privacy Act, 112th Congress
(2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.gov/
files/documents/Mobile%20Device%20Privacy%2OAct%20--%2ORep.%20
Markey%201-30-12 0.pdf. The legislation as currently proposed, however,
inadequately addresses CIQ-like collections. First, the Act only refers to
"mobile telephones" and not handsets more generally, and so would exclude
tablets and other mobile devices not also used as telephones. Id. Second,
demanding that network operators obtain informed user consent could, in
practice, simply mean another line of fine print added to a user agreement that
consumers already ignore. Id. Finally, the Act does not restrict what data
mobile companies can collect-it just requires that they inform users when they
do it. Id The law as currently written, then, would do little to prevent CIQ-like
software from continuing to create massive databases of private user information
that could be sold or hacked.
122 See supra Part IV.A.1; U.S. v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1202 (11th Cir.
2011).
123 See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; Stored Communications
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
124 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(D) (2006) (emphasis added).
125 Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1202.
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FWA protection evidences its broader intention for the Act to
cover both in-transit and stored electronic communications, and
therefore Barrington's in-transit restriction is untenable.126
Second, the structure and wording of the SCA, which explicitly
penalizes unauthorized interceptions of stored electronic
information only,'27 also reveal congressional intent to apply the
FWA to interceptions of stored communications. Section 2701(c)
of the SCA states that the SCA's penalties will not apply where the
interception in question has been addressed by Section 2518 of the
FWA-the section that outlines procedures for judicial
authorization of otherwise illegal interceptions.'2 8 Like the intra-
statute exception found in Section 2510(12)(d), this inter-statute
exception suggests that Congress did not intend for the FWA and
SCA to cover mutually exclusive types of interceptions-the SCA
covering stored only and the FWA covering in-transit only.129 The
Barrington assertion that the only interceptions covered in the
FWA are those made while the communication is in flight over an
interstate system is therefore in direct conflict with the structure of
the Act and Congressional intent. By rejecting narrow
interpretations, like Barrington, and adopting a broader
formulation of contemporaneity, courts would bring pre-transit
keylogging and other interceptions made outside of interstate
transit within the FWA as Congress originally contemplated.
B. Using "Technical Minutiae" to Interpret Statutes
Courts with a narrow view of the FWA's requirement that the
interception take place on a system affecting interstate commerce
typically rely on intricate technical distinctions to interpret the
FWA not to include keylogging-like the courts in Ropp, which
labeled the keyboard-to-PC connection a non-interstate system
separate from the PC-to-Internet system, and Scarfo, which
126 See Roundy, supra note 87, at 429 ("If ... electronic communications in
storage could never be 'intercepted' under the Wiretap Act, then why would the
definition of 'electronic communication' need a specific exclusion for stored
financial information?").
127 Stored Communications Act § 2701.
128 Federal Wiretap Act § 2518; Stored Communications Act § 2701(c).
129 See Roundy, supra note 87, at 429-30.
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considered a PC with a functional but temporarily disconnected
Internet connection a non-interstate system.'30 This approach is
problematic for several reasons. First, because of the difference
between the rate at which technologies and judicial precedent
advance, basing interpretations of the FWA's provisions entirely
on technical minutiae risks creating presently solid precedent that
quickly spoils with rapidly changing technological advances."'
While relying on technical distinctions whose changes outpace
precedential petrification creates numerous problems for courts-
particularly lower courts, which could be left with scant guiding
precedentl3 2-it is perhaps more problematic for criminal
defendants. The Fair Warning Doctrine holds that "no man shall
be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.""' Because the layperson
likely does not understand the inner workings of keylogging
software'34 or that their e-mail messages momentarily pause for
130 See U.S. v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 2004); U.S. v. Scarfo,
180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001); supra Part IV.A.2.
131 See Peter V. Roman, The Black Box Canon of Statutory Interpretation:
Why the Courts Should Treat Technology like a Black Box in Interpreting
Computer Crime Statutes, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 487, 488
(2009) ("[R]apid changes in the underlying technology mean that decisions
based on that technology may quickly become obsolete as new technology
replaces it."); see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Securing the
HIPAA Security Rule, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 12 (2007) (noting that, because of
rapidly changing security technologies, judicial decisions regarding the
sufficiency of HIPAA security measures could quickly become antiquated).
132 See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice:
Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REv. 269, 283
(noting that "[t]the Supreme Court has expressed agreement with the proposition
that changes underlying facts alter the status of the legal conclusions that rely on
those facts," and that "changes in relevant facts should prompt a reconsideration
of the cases that rely on them").
'33 U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
134 Federal courts require that expert witnesses testify to the technical
functionality of keyloggers, indicating that the average keylogger user lacks an
in-depth understanding of the technical minutiae on which courts base their
FWA interpretations. See Roman, supra note 131, at 494; see also FED. R.
EvID. 701-02 (2011).
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rerouting while in split-second transit from sender to recipient,'
and because technological design changes potentially outpace the
formation of judicial precedent, a policy of FWA interpretations
that is reliant on understanding technical minutiae risks creating a
system in which defendants never receive fair warning that their
actions potentially violate the FWA.'36
Second, by relying on specialized technical distinctions not
contemplated by Congress when it amended the FWA in 1986,
courts risk reaching myopic results that are incompatible with the
purposes of the Act.'37 The ECPA was enacted in 1986 to update
the FWA, which Congress considered antiquated because it was
largely limited to traditional telephone interceptions and did not
"address the interception of text, digital or machine
communication."' 3 8 Concerned about the pace of technological
advancements and their threat to personal privacy,' Congress
sought to protect "electronic mail," services that "permit an
individual to use a keyboard and telephone to transmit electronic
messages and data," and other new technologies that are
"interactive in nature and can involve virtually instantaneous
'3 See Councilman II, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (describing
the process by which e-mail is transferred).
136 See Roman, supra note 131, at 493-94. Supporters of a broadened FWA
interpretation might not agree that this is a downside to using narrow factual
distinctions to interpret the FWA; if keylogging is intended to be protected, why
give hackers affirmative defenses? I include this section about the fair warning
doctrine only to support the more general argument that judicial interpretations
of the FWA that rely on minute factual distinctions are generally misguided
from a statutory interpretation standpoint. That the hacker is sometimes unfairly
disadvantaged because of such interpretations does not make the point any less
valid, despite the pro-privacy tone of this Recent Development.
1' See id. at 490 ("In ECPA 'electronic storage' cases, the combination of the
courts' tendency to delve into the minutiae of technology and the weight of
precedent has led to a series of decisions that undermine the purpose of the
ECPA and have produced complex and tortured readings of the Wiretap Act.").
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 17 (1986).
13 Id. at 19 ("[I]f Congress does not act to protect the privacy of our citizens,
we may see the gradual erosion of a precious right. Privacy cannot be left to
depend solely on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as technology
advances." (citations omitted)); id. at 20 n.23 (discussing technological
advancements that are making cellular service more prone to interceptions).
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'conversations' more like a telephone call than mail."40
Furthermore, the ECPA's legislative history reflects Congress'
intention that "electronic communication" should cover "a broad
range of communication activities that affect interstate or foreign
commerce."41
Considering that backdrop, it is easy to recognize that courts
like those in Ropp, Scarfo, and Barrington have failed to protect
the Act's intent, and should therefore trade in their microscopic
focus on technical, factual distinctions for a macroscopic focus on
broader policy questions. More specifically, courts should be less
concerned about whether a keylogging interception occurs in the
moments before transmission of an electronic interstate
communication or during the transmission, and more concerned
about whether the communication is a "virtually instantaneous
'conversation[]' more like a telephone call than mail" that requires
FWA protection.'4 2
The First Circuit's treatment of the Councilman II case,
discussed earlier,'43 provides a blueprint for how this shift should
occur in all jurisdictions. Initially, the First Circuit relied on a
factual technicality in Councilman I, reasoning that, because e-mail
in transit from sender to recipient momentarily pauses during
transmission for rerouting, any interception made during this split-
second "storage" is outside of the scope of the FWA.14 Rehearing
the case en banc, the Councilman I court elevated itself above the
trees and found the forest; it applied the FWA, holding that the
technical in-transit and in-storage Councilman I distinction was
"inconsistent with Congress' intent."'45
C. Cordless Phone Analogy
Reasonable courts could disagree over the dangers of relying
on technical factual distinctions, and there are certainly solid
140 Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 35.
14 2 Id. at 22.
143 See supra, notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
'" See supra, notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
145 Councilman I, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320-21 (D. Mass. 2003), aff'd, 373
F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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counterarguments to the above point that courts should not get
bogged down in technical details.146 But even if courts choose to
argue based on technical factual minutiae like the court in Ropp,
Congress' treatment of cordless phones 47 under the FWA reveals
its intent to bring interceptions on similar systems-like pre-transit
keylogging on cell phones-within the Act.
Recall that, in Ropp, the court held that the keyboard-to-PC
connection was a non-interstate system separate from the PC-to-
Internet interstate system to which it was connected and, therefore,
the keylogging interception that occurred on the keyboard cord did
not violate the FWA.148  Cordless phones present an interesting
analogy to this non-interstate-system-within-an-interstate-system
theory. A cordless phone operates by converting its user's voice
into a radio signal that is transmitted to the phone's base.149 Under
the Ropp theory, interceptions of that signal that are made between
the handset and the base should not be covered under the FWA
because they are made over the handset-to-base system, just like
keylogging on the keyboard-to-PC system. 0
When the ECPA was first enacted, cordless phones were
explicitly exempt from coverage because radio signals were so
easily intercepted that Congress considered cordless phone users
not to have a reasonable expectation of privacy."' The rationale
14 6 See, e.g., Councilman II, 418 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (arguing
that the Fair Warning Doctrine did not apply to the e-mail interpretation in
question because "[o]ne must apply tools of statutory construction to remove the
conduct from the statute's ambit by interpreting a subtlety in the definition of
'wire communications.' ").
147 "Cordless phone" does not refer to cell phones, which are, of course,
cordless. In this context, a cordless phone is one that operates within a limited
range around its base, which itself is connected to a telephone wire. See H.R.
REP. No. 103-827, at 30 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3510
(using this definition of a cordless phone).
148 See supra Part IV.A.2.
"' See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 33 (1986) (describing the cordless phone
technology referred to in the Act).
150 See supra Part IV.A.2.
... H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 33 ("Because the communications made on some
cordless telephones can easily be intercepted with readily available technologies




for exclusion, then, was completely unrelated to the Ropp non-
interstate system theory.'5 2 In fact, once cordless phone technology
improved and could scramble radio signals traveling between the
handset and base,"' Congress removed the ECPA's cordless phone
exception by explicitly stating that the FWA "now applies to the
interception of conversations over . . . cordless phones."' 54
Congress' inclusion of cordless phone interceptions directly
addresses narrow, Ropp-like, system-within-a-system
interpretations, revealing that Congress did not intend for such
technical distinctions to preclude coverage of pre-transit
interceptions between sender and recipient over an interstate
system.
D. Narrow and Broad Interpretations Applied to CIQ
Assuming that the IQ Agent records keystrokes,' such as
phone numbers and text messages, prior to interstate transmission,
courts could come to very different conclusions depending on
which interpretation of "affecting interstate commerce" and
"interception" they apply. A court applying the Scarfo-Ropp non-
interstate-system-within-an-interstate-system approach would
likely find that the IQ Agent's interceptions do not fall within the
FWA because the interceptions occur at the time the keypad
registers the keystrokes. Such a court would hold that the keypad-
to-handset non-interstate system on which the interceptions were
made is distinct from the sender-handset-to-recipient-handset
152 Id.
153 See Basil W. Mangano, The Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act and Protection of Cordless Telephone Communications: The
Use of Technology as a Guide to Privacy, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 99, 119-20
(1996) ("Congress' willingness to protect cordless phones appears to have come
only after those phones were equipped with anti-interception devices.").
154 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 (2001); see H.R. REP. No. 103-
827, at 10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3490 ("The protections
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 are extended to cordless
phones .... ).
'5 CIQ is accused of doing much more, such as viewing the content of SMS
messages within a recipient's handset prior to being seen by the recipient. See
Carrier IQ Part #2, supra note 5. However, this paper is only focused on the
pre-transit interception of keystrokes and not any in-transit interceptions CIQ
may have made.
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interstate transit system, and therefore falls outside the Act.
Similarly, a court applying a Barrington-style narrow
interpretation would look at the timing of the interception and ask
whether it was contemporaneous with transfer. Because these
courts define "contemporaneous with transfer" exclusively to mean
interceptions of information in flight between sender and
recipient,"' such a court would likely find that the IQ Agent's pre-
transit keylogging falls outside the FWA.
For the reasons listed above,' courts should take a broader,
Szymuszkiewicz- or Councilman II-like point of view in the CIQ
context. Such a court would have the same starting point as a
Barrington court-Was the interception contemporaneous with
transfer?-but would be more willing to interpret
"contemporaneous" to apply to interceptions made outside of the'
path between the sender's cell phone and the information's
recipient, just as Szymuszkiewicz and Councilman H interpreted the
Act in an e-mail context.' Such a decision would not only fulfill
the original purpose of the Act, inferred from the stored financial
information provision and Congress' express coverage of cordless
phone interceptions, but would also result in beneficial privacy
protections and policy outcomes for hundreds of millions of
handset users.
E. Policy Benefits
In addition to the legal justifications for why the FWA should
cover pre-transit keylogging, there are specific policy benefits that
would result from bringing CIQ-like software within the Act.
First, CIQ's IQ Agent has collected a "treasure trove"l59 of handset
user data that has raised fundamental privacy concerns about who
might be capable of accessing it. Even if the software "does
exactly what [CIQ] say[s] ... no call logging, no text logging, no
URL recording" and just performs harmless diagnostics, the
software still creates an enormous dataset that third parties might
156 See cases cited supra Part IV.A. 1-2.
157 See discussion supra Part V.A-C.
158 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
159Kravets, supra note 77.
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be tempted to access.'" Advertisers, for example, would certainly
be interested in accessing information regarding the times of day
and locations that users visit certain webpages or when they
activate and deactivate certain mobile applications, all of which
could be sold as valuable market research.'6 1
In addition to advertisers, law enforcement agencies have an
interest in acquiring this information as part of criminal
investigations-and the interest is more than theoretical. The FBI
recently turned down a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
request for any manuals, documents, or other written guidance
used to access or analyze data gathered by programs developed or
deployed by CIQ."l62 The FBI denied the request not because they
lack related documentation, but because the information they do
possess is subject to a FOIA exception covering materials that, if
disclosed, could interfere with an ongoing investigation.' This
could mean that the FBI has already developed a method for
accessing CIQ data and has utilized it, or plans to utilize it, in a
160 Dennis Fisher, With Mobile Devices, Users are the Product, Not the Buyer,
THREAT POST (Dec. 7, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://threatpost.com/
en us/blogs/mobile-devices-users-are-product-not-buyer-120711 (noting that in
addition to performing "simple diagnostics . . . it's also creating a trove of
information on each user's interactions with the device and sending it off to the
carrier. That data would be quite valuable in some cases to attackers-or even
advertisers-who might like to know what Web pages a person is visiting,
where he's located at a given moment or who he's texting.").
161 See Kevin Fitchard, Is Carrier IQ Making You Your Operator's Lab Rat?,
GIGAOM (Dec. 13, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://gigaom.com/mobile/is-carrier-iq-
making-you-your-operators-lab-rat. Fitchard explained the draw for advertisers:
So if an operator wanted to test the viability of a new social media data
plan, it could track how often a subset of its customers access sites or
apps like Twitter or Facebook versus communicating via SMS. The
operators have a lot of demographic data about their customers, which
they could easily marry to the near-real-time device and network
information it collects from IQ Agents. There's a potential market
research bonanza buried in that app.
Id.
162 See Michael Morisy, FBI: Carrier IQ Files Used for "Law Enforcement
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current investigation." Couple this possibility with a recent
California Supreme Court holding that police may, without a
warrant, search an arrestee's cell phone while he is in police
custody,' 5 and there is a real, near-future possibility that arrests
could routinely be accompanied by a police search of databases of
unauthorized handset user data.'66
The technology behind CIQ-style mass keylogging has
developed beyond that used in single-victim cases like Ropp,
Scarfo, and Barrington, in which the narrow interpretations of the
FWA developed and is arguably much more dangerous simply due
to the scale of the operation."' As the public risk increases, so
should the punishment, and the FWA provides perhaps the stiffest
punishments of the possible federal statutes into which keylogging
might fall.' For example, the. FWA permits harsher civil
16 Alternatively, invoking the exception could mean that the FBI is
investigating CIQ itself, not individual handset users. See Mike Masnick, FBI
Admits That it Uses Carrier IQfor Law Enforcement Purposes; Won't Say How,
TECH DIRT (Dec. 13, 2011, 12:06 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/
blog/wireless/articles/20111213/00271717060/fbi-admits-that-it-uses-carrier-iq-
law-enforcement-purposes-wont-say-how.shtml.
165 See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011) (holding that police
search of defendants cell phone within ninety minutes of arrest did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because of "reduced expectations of privacy caused by
the arrest" (quoting U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1977)).
166 See, e.g., Greenemeier, supra note 7 ("The notion that spy agencies or law
enforcement could take advantage of Carrier IQ to access private information is
particularly relevant given the California Supreme Court case earlier this year
that awarded police the authority to search mobile phones without a warrant.").
16 7 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
168 The FWA provides for penalties of $100 per day or $10,000 per violation.
Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2522 (2006); see also Barry Levine, Fallout
Continues for Carrier IQ Tracking Software, NEWsFACTOR (Dec. 2, 2011, 3:53
PM), http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story id=81225&full skip=1.
The Stored Communications Act awards damages and recuperation of profits,
but requires that plaintiff show actual damages. Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2707 (2006); Van Alstyne v. Elec. Scriptorium, 560 F.3d 199, 208 (4th
Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff must show actual damages to recover under the
Stored Communications Act). The Pen Register Act calls for unspecified fines
or imprisonment for less than one year. Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-
3127 (2006). The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act provides for an unspecified
fine and five or ten years imprisonment, but only if the act caused a loss
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penalties-"up to $10,000 per day for each day in violation"-than
the SCA.'69 By adopting a broader standard and bringing pre-
transit keylogging firmly within the FWA, the result will be a more
effective deterrent for this type of mass data collection.
Using a narrow interpretation to exclude CIQ-like keylogging
from the FWA would also create some odd incentives for potential
hackers. Because there are few discernible differences, in effect,
between pre-transit keylogging and in-transit interception-for
example, both occur instantly and only moments apart
chronologically-it makes little sense to punish in-transit
interceptions more harshly under the FWA than pre-transit
interceptions under, for example, the SCA.'70 Somewhat
ironically, pre-transit stored communications, not in-transit
communications, are "most vulnerable to unlawful acquisition"'"
because the necessary devices are often easy to use and
inexpensive to purchase off the shelf.'72 Applying the FWA's stiff
penalties to pre-transit keylogging will therefore have the benefit
of creating appropriate deterrents for would-be hackers.
Finally, there is currently some confusion among courts and
commentators about which statute covers this type of
exceeding $5,000. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2006).
169 See Andrew R. Schulman, What Civil Practitioners Should Know About
the Federal Wiretap and Stored Communications Act (Nov. 11, 2011), available
at http://www.andrewschulman.com/Briefs/cle%20wiretap.PDF ("The Stored
Communications Act permits the same types of relief as the Wiretap Act, except
that statutory damages are limited to $1,000.").
170 Thomas P. Ludwig, Casenote, What Online Activity Does the Wiretap Act
Protect? The Ninth Circuit Holds that Unauthorized Access of a Secure Website
Does Not Violate the Federal Wiretap Act: Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 7
COMPUTER. L. REv. & TECH. J. 301, 308 (2002-2003) (noting that a definition
of "intercept" bringing keystroke logging within the FWA "avoids the situation
in which a hacker or similarly unauthorized party can circumvent the harsher
penalties of the Wiretap Act by simply waiting to acquire the contents of an
electronic communication until it rests either permanently or temporarily in
electronic storage . . ..
17' Id.
172 See, e.g., Roundy, supra note 87, at 403-04 (noting that pre-transit
interceptions are normally easier, cheaper, and more efficient than interceptions
made while the communication is in transit between sender and recipient).
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keylogging..: the SCA,17 4 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,"'
the Pen Register Act,"6 or the FWA.' 7 By narrowly interpreting
the FWA, courts exacerbate the problem by removing the FWA as
a potential sanctuary for keylogging claims. An interpretation that
ignores the hyper-technical distinctions between interstate systems
and their sub-systems would provide a statutory home within the
FWA for keylogging that is currently nonexistent.
173 Paul Koob, Comment, Not Enough Fingers in the Dam: A Call for
Federal Regulation of Keyloggers, 28 TEMP. J. SC. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 125,
127-28 (2009); see also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting
"Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1596, 1617 (2003) (noting that there are few available decisions interpreting
portions of computer misuse statutes, and even these "reflect a diverse range of
possible approaches").
174 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006).
17 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
176 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. At least one commentator has noted how
keylogging has failed to find a sufficient home within federal surveillance
legislation:
[T]he Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, despite its most recent
amendments, has significant private enforceability issues that weaken
its potential power to combat the problems of keystroke loggers. Other
federal statutes pertaining to surveillance exist, but these other
components of the current legal landscape are insufficient to
effectively alleviate the problems associated with keylogging devices.
The current federal surveillance legislation also includes the Electronic
Communications Protection Act ... . [but] [d]ue to various courts'
statutory interpretations of these provisions, many individuals who use
keylogging devices and software can escape liability, falling outside
the range of current federal legislation.
Koob, supra note 173, at 127-28. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, for
example, requires the plaintiff to prove damages in excess of $5,000, and some
courts require an additional showing of a service interruption. Id. Therefore,
"the [Computer Fraud and Abuse Act] creates barriers for private plaintiffs
attempting to assert claims against individuals who have used keylogging
software .. .. " Id. at 135. See generally Sagi Schwartzberg, Hacking the
Fourth: How the Gaps in the Law and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Leave
the Right to Privacy at Risk, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 467 (2009) (discussing
various gaps in privacy law, including the conflict between technological
advancement and the constitutional right to privacy).
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VI. CONCLUSION
CIQ's IQ Agent software poses unique and substantial threats
to handset user privacy. Viewed historically, the litigation is
symptomatic of the broader tension between the inevitability of
technological advancement and the desire for individual control
over private information. Several courts, including those in Ropp,
Scarfo, and Barrington, have created misguided FWA precedents
that are inconsistent with congressional intent to protect continual
interceptions of pre-transit electronic communications that are
conceptually part of the communications process. By abandoning
narrow judicial interpretations of the FWA and, instead,
interpreting the Act broadly, courts would remain true to the
statute's original purpose, reach desirable policy outcomes, and
help to sharpen our modem understanding of individual privacy
rights.
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